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We empirically study the determinants of intra-household decision power with respect to 
economic and financial choices using a direct measure provided in the 1989-2010 Bank of 
Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth. Focusing on a sample of couples, we evaluate 
the effect of each spouse's characteristics, household characteristics, and background 
variables. We find that the probability that the wife is in charge is affected by household 
characteristics such as family size and total income and wealth, but more importantly that it 
increases with the difference between hers and her husband's characteristics in terms of age, 
education, and income. The main conclusion is that decision-making power over family 
economics is not only determined by strictly economic differences, as suggested by previous 
studies, but also by differences in human capital and experience. Finally, exploiting the time 
dimension of our dataset, we show that this pattern is increasing over time.  
 
JEL classification: J12, D13, E21, G11.  
 





    The goal of this paper is to investigate the determinants of intra-household decision-
making power with respect to economic and financial choices. Using a direct measure of 
actual decision-making power, we study its main determinants, taking into account individual 
characteristics of each spouse, household characteristics, and aggregate background factors. 
To identify the drivers of bargaining power has crucial implications for understanding how 
resources are distributed within the family, how household decisions are made in a variety of 
economic and non-economic realms, and how gender-based development initiatives should 
be designed.  
     Direct measures of bargaining power are however very rare. Our measure is provided by a 
repeated cross-sectional survey conducted by the Bank of Italy - the Survey of Household 
Income and Wealth (SHIW) - that reports who, within the household, is declared as the head, 
i.e., the person who is responsible for the financial and economic choices. Since the dataset 
now includes eleven waves, covering a 22 years period from 1989 to 2010, it represents a 
unique tool for the analysis of decision power, its evolution, and its determinants. 
     Previous theoretical research has developed models of household bargaining improving 
over the implications of a unitary approach to family economics. At the empirical level the 
search for the determinants of power has considered various factors such as each spouse's 
relative income, age, education, health, and also cultural factors involving race and religion. 
The main conclusion from the empirical literature is that economic factors, captured mainly 
by differences in earnings but also in occupational status, are the decisive ones in determining 
which spouse is in a position of prominence within the household.  
     In this paper we are able to uncover that, beside strictly economic differentials, other sorts 
of marriage heterogamy, such as age and education, emerge as equally important 
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determinants of power, suggesting that knowledge, human capital accumulation, experience, 
seniority, and savviness can play an independent role. Since during the period we consider 
female educational achievements relative to those of males, as well as the demographics of 
marriage, have evolved at least as much as the economic position of women, it is not 
surprising that the parallel large increase of female empowerment can be linked to broader 
societal trends.  
     We first document these trends. We show how our measure of female empowerment, 
which is captured by the proportion of households headed by the wife, has increased through 
time. We also illustrate the evolution of the factors that are more likely to be responsible for 
the observed changes in the intra-household balance of power. For individual characteristics 
such as age, education, income, and occupational status, we document how intra-family 
gender differentials have changed. We also report trends for aggregate indicators, such as 
female labor market participation to account for the evolution of women’s economic 
condition and the incidence of divorce to understand the evolution of family structure.  
     Italy provides an ideal setting for our investigation. On the one hand, the sample period 
witnesses significant developments, along the gender dimension, in the economic and 
financial behavior of Italian households, with a substantial increase in the number of females 
in charge of decisions. At the same time, the Italian society experiences a particularly fast 
evolution, with a pronounced transformation of its family structure: while divorce became 
legal in Italy only in 1974, divorce figures boost in the most recent years of our sample. 
Moreover, women’s participation in the labor market has been slowly increasing since the 
early post-war period. Even though it remains limited in an international comparison, its 
expansion has profoundly altered the role of women within family and society. The 
educational attainment of Italian women, particularly at the higher education level, is quickly 
catching up relative to that of men, a tendency which is common to other countries. 
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Furthermore, marriage markets and matching patterns have also evolved in association with 
the described tendencies. As a consequence, our sample can fully capture the joint evolution 
of economic, social, and demographic factors.   
     Our next step is to study the empirical determinants of bargaining power by modeling the 
probability that the wife is in charge of economic and financial decisions as a function of 
individual characteristics of both spouses, household variables, and aggregate background 
factors. The hypothesis we test is that bargaining power is increasing with within-couple 
differentials in terms of age, education and income. Our findings confirm that  the probability 
that the wife is in charge increases with the difference between her years of age, her level of 
education, her individual income, and the corresponding husband’s characteristics. In other 
words, the balance of power between husband and wife is not just a question of money, but 
also of brains. Moreover, we show that bargaining power is also affected by household 
characteristics such as family size and total income and wealth, while aggregate background 
factors do not add further explanatory power. These results represent an important step 
forward with respect to the available literature, especially in light of the fact that women’s 
educational attainment is converging to that of men much faster than earnings.  
     In a series of robustness checks we also show that our results hold even after controlling 
for the type of choices households face, distinguished between simple and sophisticated 
economic and financial decisions. Similarly, using finer definitions of occupational status 
carries additional explanatory power but does not alter our conclusion. Finally, we check the 
sensitiveness of our findings to alternative samples. For a sample of non-married couples, we 
find somewhat different results which confirm the practical relevance of the institution of 
marriage. For a sub-sample of middle-age couples, we find that age no longer matters, in line 
with a stream of literature based on surveys exclusively administered to older couples.  
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     Finally, our results carry important implications also with respect to another literature that, 
in the absence of a direct measure of bargaining power, tries to estimate its impact on a 
variety of decisions by using proxies often defined as dummy variables capturing the fact that 
the wife is older or more educated. We show that these proxies are poor predictors of actual 
bargaining power, both because they measure intra-family differences in a coarser fashion, if 
compared to our differentials, and because they fail to account for the fact that bargaining 
power is simultaneously determined by individual and household variables which are often 
omitted. 
     The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the related literature. 
Section 3 describes our dataset and reports stylized facts. Section 4 presents our empirical 
findings and Section 5 performs robustness checks. Section 6 concludes and suggests 
directions for future research.  
 
2. Related literature 
  
     The relevance of gender within the literature on household decisions is well established 
for a variety of economic and non-economic issues, ranging from political choices (Edlund 
and Pande, 2002) and preferences toward the size of government (Lott and Kenny, 1999) to 
wealth accumulation and saving behavior. Examples within the financial literature are 
Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998), Sundén and Surette (1998), Barber and Odean (2001), 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2008), and Croson and Gneezy (2009). The prevailing conclusion from 
these studies is that women reveal a higher degree of risk aversion, so that households where 
decisions are made by women tend to select less risky investments. For Italian SHIW data, 
these results are confirmed by Guiso and Jappelli (2002) and Bertocchi, Brunetti and 
Torricelli (2011).   
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     A deeper question behind these results is what determines which spouse is in control of 
family decisions. There is a relatively small empirical literature on the determinants of the 
intra-household decision-making process that focuses, as we do, on direct measures of 
bargaining power. One reason why the literature is small is that such measures are rare. A 
number of papers are based on data collected by the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), 
which is one of the few surveys that provides specific information about this issue. In 
particular, couples are asked to report which spouse has the “final say” in making major 
economic and financial decisions for the household. The question was asked in the first two 
waves, i.e., 1992 and 1994, with comparable answers. Subsequently, it was only asked of the 
much smaller sample of new entrants. Therefore, most studies only use the first wave. Since 
the HRS is sponsored by the National Institute on Aging, the survey initially included only 
individuals between the age of 51 and 61 in 1991, plus their partners (who may have been 
older or younger). Therefore, the sample reflects a narrow share of the population. Another 
distinctive feature of the HRS survey is that the same question is answered independently by 
both the husband and the wife, so that they may well disagree on the answer. It turns out that 
indeed in the first wave only 63.5% of the partners agreed.  
     Based on the 1992 wave, Elder and Rudolph (2003) find that decisions are more likely to 
be made by the spouse with more financial knowledge, more education, and a higher wage, 
irrespective of gender. They interpret this evidence as supportive of a bargaining approach to 
decision making, rather than a unitary approach. The conclusions they reach hold true both 
for the husbands’ and the wives’ opinions and over both the entire sample and the sub-sample 
consisting of those households where the partners agree. Based on the same data, Friedberg 
and Webb (2006) find that decision-making power depends on relative earnings, even though 
the magnitudes of the estimated effects are moderate. Lührmann and Maurer (2007) use data 
from the 2003 wave of the Mexican Health and Aging Study (MHS). The survey is similar in 
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design to the US HRS and covers the Mexican population over 50 years of age (and their 
partners). They find that for this sample education and employment status are associated with 
more individual decision power, especially for women. Health, income, and the level of 
urbanity of the area in which the household lives also matter.1 Woolley (2003) focuses on a 
small sample of  300 Canadian interviewed in 1995 about a number of specific financial tasks 
(cash withdrawals, writing checks, etc.) and finds that higher income is associated with more 
decision power both for males and females, while male education also matters. Across the 
contributions reported above, income emerges as the most robust determinant of intra-
household bargaining power. There is also some evidence that education may matter as well.  
     A parallel research line has tried to estimate the consequences of the distribution of 
bargaining power within the family on a variety of economic and non-economic decisions. In 
the absence of direct measures of bargaining power, this literature typically relies on the use 
of proxies, often constructed as dummies measuring various dimensions of heterogamy, such 
as income, education, age, but also race and religion. For instance, Lundberg, Startz and 
Stillman (2003) focus on dummies for age differences to explain the decline in household 
consumption after retirement. Lundberg and Ward-Batts (2000) show that a larger gap in the 
educational level (which in this case is measured not as a dummy but in actual number of 
years of difference), with the husband being more educated than the wife, is associated with 
lower household wealth.  Thomas (1994) finds that a dummy identifying wives that are more 
educated than their husbands is indicative of power in asserting preferences in the allocation 
of household resources in Ghana. For China, Li and Wu (2010) propose a measure of 
women’s relative power based on the gender of the first-born, with sons being associated 
                                                 
1 The UK Household Panel Survey also contains a ‘final say’ question and in addition it 
collects information about the allocation of minor financial management duties. See 
Dobbelsteen and Kooreman (1997). 
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with more power than daughters. Similarly, research on the determinants of marital instability 
shows the importance of socio-demographic disparity within the couple as a factor 
determining marital dissolution. Heaton (2002) and Teachman (2002) find that couples are 
more likely to divorce when they do not share the same education background, particularly 
when it is the wife who is more educated, and that this effect is stable, or even increasing, 
over time. Within an empirical investigation of households' investment decisions, Bertocchi, 
Brunetti and Torricelli (2011) employ dummy variables capturing the fact that the wife is 
more educated, older, or earning more as proxies for marital instability. 
     With respect to the datasets used in previous contributions the SHIW data we employ 
present several advantages. First of all, they include households of all ages. Second, eleven 
waves are currently available, so that they cover the 1989-2010 period. Third, the way the 
survey is administered does not give partners the option to disagree, since they can only 
report a joint single answer when asked to indicate who the economic and financial head is. 
In other words, our data directly and unambiguously reflect the final outcome of any potential 
process of convergence of initial disagreement. Finally, our dataset presents the additional 
advantage of supplying information both on direct measures of bargaining power and on their 
potential determinants, including detailed individual characteristics of both spouses, 
household characteristics, and aggregate background variables. Therefore, we are able to 
assess whether or not the proxies commonly employed can be validated as indirect but 
accurate measures of bargaining power, taking into account how within-couples 
heterogeneities, but also additional covariates, are in fact associated with such power.  
     Another stream of empirical research which is relevant for our perspective is the one that 
has documented and analyzed the patterns of assortative mating (see Lam, 1988, Kalmijn, 
1991, Mare, 1991, and Lewis and Oppenheimer, 2000) and how they are interrelated with 
husbands’ and wives’ educational and occupational achievements, as well as their change. 
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While a general finding in this literature is the existence of positive assortative mating, trends 
in marital homogamy actually differ across traits, which underscores the importance of 
considering multiple dimensions of within-couple differentials.2  
     At the theoretical level, Browning, Chiappori and Weiss (2011) offer an up-to-date, 
exhaustive review of the literature that has modeled the decision-making process within the 
household, from the unitary model to cooperative and non cooperative bargaining models. 
Some bargaining models also allow to integrate the analysis of distribution within the couple 
with a matching model of the marriage market, thus accounting for assortative mating 
patterns. In a context where assortative mating patterns evolve, and do so in multiple 
dimensions, it is crucial to understand how this evolution affects bargaining after a couple is 
formed. Iyigun and Walsh (2007) incorporate pre-marital investment in education and 
spousal matching into a collective household model, to show that sharing rules depend on 
education. We view our results as supportive of this prediction.  
 
3. Data and stylized facts 
 
Our dataset spans over the 1989-2010 period and draws from the Bank of Italy Survey on 
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) and from Istat (the Italian National Institute of 
Statistics). The SHIW is a repeated, biennial cross-sectional survey which provides over that 
period eleven waves (1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 
                                                 
2 See Fernandez, Guner and Knowles (2005) for a model of sorting.  
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2010).  In each wave, data are collected for around 8,000 households, out of which we select 
those where a married couple is present, for a total of 59,389 observations. 3 
The SHIW basic sample unit is the household defined as “a group of cohabiting people 
who, regardless for their relationships, satisfy their needs by pooling all or part of their 
incomes”. In contrast with household surveys conducted in other countries, where the 
household head is defined on the basis of different attributes (e.g., highest income, or male 
gender), a distinctive feature of the Italian survey is to introduce the “declared” definition: 
accordingly, a household head is identified as the person who is responsible for the financial 
and economic choices of the household. This definition can be interpreted as an objective, 
joint evaluation of the actual balance of power, or else as the outcome of the process of 
convergence of any potential initial disagreement. Therefore, the survey provides a direct and 
unambiguous measure of bargaining power regarding economic and financial decisions. This 
is the measure that we employ in this paper to capture decision power within the couple.  
The SHIW also provides plenty of demographic information for the household as a whole 
and for each household member. As for the former, we use the number of household 
components, household income, and household net wealth (the latter including real and 
financial assets net of financial liabilities). For each partner, we consider age, education, 
occupational status, and individual income.4 Since the 2000 wave, the SHIW provides 
additional information on the occupational status (i.e., having a tenure contract or a part-time 
job) and on the type of banking services used by the household (ranging from paying the bills 
to financial assets trading), which we also include. 
                                                 
3 In Section 5.3, we also construct an alternative sample of non-married couples, including 
811 observations. For more details on the SHIW see 
http://www.bancaditalia.it/statistiche/indcamp/bilfait.  
4 All monetary amounts are expressed in real terms using the 1989 CPI provided by ISTAT. 
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We supplement our dataset with aggregate variables based on data provided by Istat.5 
These variables are the divorce hazard and the female employment rate, both at the regional 
level. The divorce hazard is the ratio of the number of divorces over the number of 
marriages.6 The female employment rate is the ratio between women employed over the total 
female working-age population.  
     Table 1 reports summary statistics for all the variables used (see Table A.1 in the Appendix 
for a detailed description of the same) for our sample of married couples. Only 14.23% of the 
couples report the wife as the household head.7 The average age is 53.13 for husbands, 49.48 
for wives. Their education level is relatively close, at 3.08 and 2.99 respectively, with a 
slightly larger standard variation for women: on average, the individuals in the sample have a 
secondary school degree. We find a marked difference in average individual income with 
husbands at around €13.737 and wives at around €4.358. This difference is reflected in the 
proportion of husbands and wives that work, which is 62.32% and 35.26%, respectively. Table 
1 also reports information about differences within the couples in all the above dimensions, as 
well as a set of dummies recording the fact that the wife is older, more educated and earning 
more, respectively. The latter confirm that wives are older than their husbands only in 11% of 
the cases, while they earn more in 9% of the cases despite being more educated in 18% of the 
cases.  
                                                 
5 Data are downloadable from http://www.istat.it.  
6 We employ the divorce hazard since, contrary to the crude divorce rate (divorces over every 
1000 residents), it takes into account both the increasing dynamics of divorce and the 
decreasing dynamics of marriage. 
7 While it is true that some misreporting may be present, if anything we would expect under-




Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Female head 0.1423 0.3494 0 1
Household characteristics     
Family size  3.2636 1.1006 2 12
Income 20.1018 15.1416 -27.5 614.4
Wealth 133.0929 247.2230 -445.0 15743.7
Only wife works 0.0444 0.2061 0 1
Only husband works 0.3150 0.4645 0 1
None works 0.3324 0.4711 0 1
Simple choices  0.7865 0.4098 0 1
Wife’s characteristics      
Age 49.4754 14.1399 16 96
Education  2.9900 1.0559 1 6
Income  4.3581 5.6219 -11.1 165.4
Working  0.3526 0.4778 0 1
Employee  0.2666 0.4422 0 1
Self-employed 0.0860 0.2804 0 1
Tenured 0.3898 0.4877 0 1
Part-time 0.0126 0.1116 0 1
Housewife 0.4200 0.4936 0 1
Retired 0.2000 0.4000 0 1
Husband’s characteristics      
Age 53.1335 14.3895 19 98
Education  3.0832 1.0364 1 6
Income  13.7369 12.0236 -67.3 607.0
Working  0.6232 0.4846 0 1
Employee  0.4273 0.4947 0 1
Self-employed 0.1959 0.3969 0 1
Tenured 0.2522 0.4343 0 1
Part-time 0.0698 0.2548  
Retired 0.3451 0.4754 0 1
Within-couples differentials     
Age differential  -3.6581 4.0816 -57 48
Education differential  -0.0932 0.7701 -4 3
Income differential  -9.3789 12.2156 -599.7 100.9
Dummies for within-couples differences     
Wife older 0.1099 0.3127 0 1
Wife more educated  0.1755 0.3804 0 1
Wife earns more  0.0928 0.2901 0 1
Background variables   
Divorce hazard  0.1540 0.0907 0.0186 0.4537
Female employment rate 0.3090 0.0850 0.1309 0.4549




The above descriptive statistics for the pooled sample can be supplemented by information 
about the time evolution within the sample period. First of all, the proportion of households 
reporting the wife as the economic decision maker has greatly increased from 1.6% in 1989 
to 30.8% in 2010. This trend is illustrated in Figure 1. Over the same period, the average age 
of both partners has increased: from 50.58 to 55.82 for husbands and from 46.89 to 52.27 for 
wives. This trend reflects both the general ageing in the population and the decline of 
marriage (the latter force tends to exclude younger generations from our sample of married 
couples). The average age difference has narrowed from 3.69 to 3.55 years (see again Figure 
1). The average level of education has increased from 2.90 to 3.27 and from 2.77 to 3.22, 
respectively, which means that the differential between genders has nearly disappeared as of 
2010 (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 1. Female head proportion and husband’s and wife’s average age 
 
Note: Authors’ elaborations on SHIW data. Female head proportion on 










Figure 2. Female head proportion and husband’s and wife’s average education level 
 
Note: Authors’ elaborations on SHIW data. Female head proportion on 




Figure 3. Female head proportion and husband’s and wife’s average income 
 
Note: Authors’ elaborations on SHIW data. Female head proportion on 




Figure 4. Female head and proportions of working husbands and wives 
 
Note: Authors’ elaborations on SHIW data.  Proportions of female 
heads on left scale and of working husbands and wives on right scale.       
 
 
The income differential (conditional on being working) has instead remained more stable 
(Figure 3). The proportion of working husbands was 69.83% in 1989 and declines to 58.65% 
in 2010. The corresponding figures for women (31.85% and 37.72%) provide evidence of 
convergence but also at the same time of persistence of a marked gender difference (Figure 
4).  
It is useful to compare the evolution of the individual variables with those of aggregate 
indicators such as the divorce hazard and the female employment rate, measured at the 
regional level, as we do in Figure 5. The divorce hazard jumps from 9.62 to 26.92 over the 
period under consideration. While the decline of marriage and the increasing diffusion of 
divorce represent a common tendency in industrialized countries, in this dimension the Italian 
society has experienced a particularly fast evolution. The initial decline shown in the figure 
can be explained as follows. Up to the 1974 divorce was illegal and Italy was still exhibiting 
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a very traditional family structure, if compared to other Western countries. The original form 
of the legislation was very conservative and allowed couples to obtain a divorce only five 
years after their legal separation. However, in 1987 the waiting period was reduced to three 
years, thus provoking a sudden jump of the divorce hazard, which is partially reversed in the 
early 1990s.  Female employment increases from 24.05% to 34.11%,8 even though women's 
labor market participation has historically been lower than in most industrialized countries.9  
 
 
Figure 5. Female head proportion, divorce hazard and female employment rate 
 
Note: Authors’ elaborations on SHIW and Istat data.  Female head 
proportion and divorce hazard*100 on left scale and female 
employment rate on right scale.       
                                                 
8 See Del Boca and Pasqua (2003) on the employment patterns of husbands and wives in 
Italy.  
9 See Fernandez and Fogli (2009) for an international comparison of female labor force 
participation rates and for their link with a country's culture.  
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Overall, these figures document a marked evolution of Italian economy and society, with a 
profound transformation of family structure and an increasing participation of women into the 




To test our hypotheses, we estimate a probit model for the probability that the wife is the 
household head, i.e., the primary economic and financial decision maker as declared by the 
couple. For this model, we run a set of pooled regressions with robust standard errors 
clustered at the regional level. All regressions include a set of time and regional dummies, 
with the initial year and Piedmont taken as reference categories. All tables report marginal 
effects.  
    We start in Table 2 by inserting the individual characteristics of the wife and the husband 
separately. Next, in Table 3, we will exploit the same information in the form of differentials.  
 
Table 2. The determinants of decision-making power 
Dependent variable: Female  head 
Variables  (1) (2) 
Household characteristics 
Family size 0.0183*** 0.0224*** 
  (2.917) (3.444) 
Family size 2 -0.0017** -0.0020*** 
  (2.257) (2.676) 
Income – 2nd quartile 0.0172** 0.0043 
 (2.496) (1.006) 
Income – 3rd quartile 0.0116 -0.0137*** 
 (1.252) (2.863) 
Income – 4th quartile 0.0115 -0.0291*** 
 (0.727) (4.243) 
Wealth – 2nd quartile -0.0013 -0.0055* 
 (0.373) (1.832) 
Wealth – 3rd quartile -0.0043 -0.0099*** 
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 (1.272) (3.798) 
Wealth – 4th quartile -0.0069 -0.0167*** 
 (1.524) (5.547) 
Wife’s characteristics 
Age  -0.0019*** 0.0057*** 
  (4.570) (6.014) 
Age2  -0.0077*** 
   (8.710) 
Education 0.0008 0.0283*** 
  (0.579) (3.730) 
Education2  -0.5187*** 
   (4.476) 
Income  0.0155*** 0.0230*** 
  (27.693) (18.934) 
Income2  -0.0191*** 
   (5.476) 
Working wife -0.0849*** -0.1000*** 
  (14.594) (20.094) 
Husband’s characteristics 
Age  0.0007* -0.0049*** 
  (1.737) (4.287) 
Age2  0.0052*** 
   (4.729) 
Education -0.003 -0.0353*** 
  (1.219) (5.476) 
Education2  0.5077*** 
   (4.541) 
Income  -0.0104*** -0.0087*** 
  (5.671) (9.069) 
Income2  0.0015*** 
   (9.120) 
Working husband 0.0411*** 0.0399*** 
  (6.920) (9.483) 
Background variables 
Divorce hazard  -0.0869 -0.0833 
  (1.047) (1.116) 
Female employment rate 0.0715 0.0541 
  (0.351) (0.281) 
Observations 59,389 59,389 
Pseudo R2 0.3413 0.3651 
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Notes: Marginal effects of probit estimates with robust standard errors 
clustered at the regional level. Each regression includes time and regional 
dummies.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
     Table 2 presents as a benchmark a basic specification including four sets of variables 
(Column 1). The first set includes standard household characteristics, namely the number of 
household components and its squared term as well as household income and wealth 
quartiles. The second and third set include individual characteristics of the wife and the 
husband, respectively, namely each spouse’s age, level of education, income, and 
occupational status (the latter as a dummy taking value 1 if the individual is working, 0 
otherwise). The last set controls for aggregate background variables which are meant to 
capture the evolution of gender roles in the family and society: namely, the increasing 
incidence of divorce and the expansion of female labor market participation. These variables 
are the divorce hazard and the female employment rate, computed at the regional level.     
    Column 1 shows that the probability that the wife is in charge increases with the size of the 
family in a concave fashion. Standard economic characteristics such as household income 
and wealth do not appear to matter except for the positive effect of the second quartile for 
income. Once we turn to individual characteristics, we find that age matters negatively for the 
wife, while it has a positive but barely significant effect for the husband: according to the 
estimates on average every additional year of age reduces the wife's probability to be in 
charge by 0.0019, while it reduces the corresponding husband's probability by 0.0007. 
Education is not significant, both for the wife and the husband. When entered separately, 
each spouse's earning power appears to matter in the expected direction: the wife’s decision 
power increases with her income and decreases with that of the husband. More specifically, 
an increase of a thousand euro in the wife’s income substantially increases the probability for 
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her of being in charge by 0.0155, while the same amount added to the income of her husband 
reduces this probability by 0.0104. Each spouse’s occupational status is also relevant: a 
working husband implies a larger probability that the wife is in charge, while a working wife 
decreases such probability, suggesting that after controlling for everything else there may be 
a division of tasks operating within the family, with certain chores being allocated to the 
spouse who has more time to spare.  Finally, whether the family lives in a region affected by 
a large divorce hazard has a negative but insignificant effect, while the effect of the regional 
female occupational level is positively associated with women’s empowerment but again 
insignificantly so.  
     In Column 2 of Table 2 we investigate the hypothesis that the effect of individual 
characteristics involving age, education and income may have a non-linear influence on the 
dependent variable. Therefore we add squared terms for all the three variables, both for the 
wife and the husband. The resulting picture is profoundly altered, not only with respect to 
each of these variables, but also with respect to the variables capturing household 
characteristics. Namely, starting with individual variables, we find that the impact of the 
wife’s age is confirmed, but its influence is non-linear, with wives of intermediate age (at 
around age 37) more likely to find themselves in a position of power, rather than older ones 
as suggested by the linear specification. The non-linear specification reveals that the 
husband’s age also has a highly significant non-linear influence, with women’s power being 
lower when the husband is middle-aged (48 years of age). In other words, very young and 
very old husbands (possibly for very different reasons having to do with culture and health 
respectively) are more likely to let their wives decide. Turning to education, we again find 
that for wives its effect is not linear, with maximum women's power reached at the high 
school level. The exact opposite is true for husbands, since it is at an intermediate level 
(between high school and college) that they are more likely to abdicate. The impact of 
 
 22
individual income is also modified in the non-linear specification: for the wife’s income the 
positive effect of the linear term is confirmed, but is accompanied by a negative effect of the 
square, which suggests that wives with a large income may actually prefer to delegate. 
Similarly, we find a non-linear, specular effect of the husbands’ income. Interestingly, 
accounting for the non-linear effect of individual characteristics also modifies previous 
conclusions regarding household variables: while the influence of family size is confirmed, 
Column 2 reveals that women’s empowerment is decreasing in income and wealth, a feature 
which was obscured in Column 1.10 To sum up, the comparison between Columns 1 and 2 
shows that not only individual characteristics concerning age, education, income, and 
occupational status matter, but also that their effect is non-linear and that household income 
and wealth do play a role, suggesting that the first model is misspecified. Since the two 
models in Table 2 are nested, we statistically test for the joint significance of the added terms: 
the evidence supports the hypothesis that the two models are statistically different from each 
other. Similarly, a test for the joint significance of the set of controls for each spouse’s 
characteristics confirms that both the husbands’ and wives’ characteristics retain independent 
roles in determining which partner holds the decision power.  
                                                 
10 Total household income is the sum of the incomes of all the household members, so that it 
differs from the sum of husband and wife incomes only in the presence of additional working 
members in the household. As a result, the difference is in most cases not that large and this 
might well explain why in the first specification total income is not statistically significant. 
Introducing the quadratic term for the individual levels contributes to make such difference 
no longer negligible, allowing total income to retain an independent role with respect to the 
spouses’ individual incomes. Our main results persist also under different model 
specifications concerning income and wealth, i.e., considering their linear and quadratic 
terms or their logs (which reduce the impact of possible outliers). 
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     In sum, in Table 2 we have replicated (Column 1) and extended (Column 2) the 
benchmark model stemming from the relatively small literature (see Elder and Rudolph, 
2003, Friedberg and Webb, 2006, Lührmann and Maurer, 2007, and Woolley, 2003) that has 
tried to investigate, as we do, the determinants of intra-household bargaining power when it 
can be measured by a directly-observed sort of dependent variable.  
As mentioned in Section 2, however, there is a larger literature that has tried to assess the 
influence of bargaining power on a variety of economic and non-economic decisions and, in 
the absence of any direct measure, has relied on proxies of each spouse’s relative power. 
These proxies are often dummies capturing the fact that a spouse may or may not have a 
higher age, education, or income level. Exploiting the fact that we do have a direct measure 
of empowerment, what we do in Table 3 is to verify if any dimension of marriage 
heterogamy, such as age, education, or income, is really significantly associated with the 
probability that the wife is in charge. Since we have precise information about individual 
characteristics, we capture marriage heterogamy along these three dimensions not simply as 
dummies but as differentials. Namely, we first introduce as a regressor a variable which 
measures the difference in years between the age of the wife and that of the husband. The 
second regressor is the difference between the wife’s and the husband’s level of education, 
the third is similarly defined for their income. Summary statistics for each kind of differential 
are presented in Table 1. We regress our binary dependent variable for the wife being in 
charge on these differentials. We start by reporting the results of simple regressions involving 
each differential, one by one, and then we estimate a fourth regression including the three 
differentials together.  
Table 3. Within-couple differentials  
Dependent variable: Female  head 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Proxies for bargaining power 
Age differential  0.00004   -0.0004 0.0049*** 
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  (0.084)     (0.809) (4.287) 
Education differential   0.0306***  0.0043*** 0.0353*** 
    (13.040)   (2.952) (5.476) 
Income differential    0.0102*** 0.0101*** 0.0087*** 
   (9.906) (9.795) (9.069) 
Household characteristics 
Family size         0.0224*** 
          (3.444) 
Family size2     -0.0020*** 
          (2.676) 
Income – 2nd quartile     0.0043 
     (1.006) 
Income – 3rd quartile     -0.0137*** 
     (2.863) 
Income – 4th quartile     -0.0291*** 
     (4.243) 
Wealth – 2nd quartile     -0.0055* 
     (1.832) 
Wealth – 3rd quartile     -0.0099*** 
     (3.798) 
Wealth – 4th quartile     -0.0167*** 
     (5.547) 
Wife’s characteristics 
Age          0.0008 
          (1.394) 
Age2     -0.0077*** 
          (8.710) 
Education     -0.007 
          (1.164) 
Education2     -0.5187*** 
          (4.476) 
Income      0.0143*** 
          (12.810) 
Income2     -0.0191*** 
          (5.476) 
Working wife     -0.1000*** 
          (20.094) 
Husband’s characteristics 
Age2     0.0052*** 
          (4.729) 
Education2     0.5077*** 
          (4.541) 
Income2     0.0015*** 
          (9.120) 
Working husband     0.0399*** 




Divorce hazard          -0.0833 
          (1.116) 
Female employment rate         0.0541 
     (0.281) 
Observations 59,389 59,389 59,389 59,389 59,389 
Pseudo R2 0.1177 0.1255 0.285 0.2852 0.3651 
Notes: Marginal effects of probit estimates with robust standard errors clustered at the 
regional level. Each regression includes time and regional dummies.* significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
 
     In Column 1 of Table 3 we find that the age differential is not significantly associated with 
power, even though the sign of the effect is positive as one might expect, since the older is 
the wife relative to the husband, the more likely is that she is regarded as more experienced 
and savvy, and thus a more reliable decision maker. A similar story is instead validated by 
Column 2, where the education differential is positively associated with power: the larger is 
the wife’s level of education relative to the husband, the more likely is that she decides. The 
same occurs for their income differential in Column 3, while Column 4 shows that the 
relevance of both the education and the income differentials is confirmed when accounting 
for the three dimensions together, even though the size of the effect of education is smaller 
once income is accounted for, which signals that the two types of differences are correlated. 
The effect of the age differential is reversed but remains insignificant. While at first glance 
the conclusion that can be drawn from Columns 1-4 is that the use of proxies for bargaining 
power is a reasonable approach, at least as far as education and income differentials are 
concerned, we are interested in combining this evidence with what we know from Table 2 
about a broader set of potential determinants of decision power.  
     These preliminary considerations are those behind our preferred specification, which we 
introduce in Column 5 of Table 3, where we simply rearrange the covariates introduced in the 
non-linear specification in Column 2 of Table 2 in such a way that differentials within the 
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couples, with respect to age, education, and income, are emphasized. 11 The purpose of the 
exercise is two-fold. First of all, in comparison with the previous specification, we can now 
fully capture the effect of heterogeneities within the couple. Second, we can evaluate how the 
relationship between differentials and our observed measure of bargaining is affected by the 
additional covariates.  
Interestingly, now all the three dimensions of the within-couple differentials are highly 
significant and with the expected sign, suggesting that the relative bargaining power within 
the household is determined by a position of dominance which is not simply associated with 
earning power but also with education as well as age. Table 3 highlights that additional 
empowerment of wives does not come from their individual characteristics per se, but from 
the relative distance from the husbands' corresponding characteristics. 
     Finally, in order to test the determinants of decision power along the time dimension, in 
Table 4 we report an extended specification of Column 5 of Table 3 where each within-
couple differential is interacted with a full set of time dummies, taking 1989 as reference 
year. The marginal effects of the other regressors are omitted for brevity. The three 
dimensions of the within-couple differentials are all highly significant. The age differential 
does not show any time variability since all the interactions with the time dummies are not 
significant. As for the education differential, all interactions but 2008 are significant with a 
negative sign and decreasing magnitude, indicating that the total effect of the education 
differential is increasing over time. The interactions between the income differential and the 
                                                 
11 The probit estimated in Table 2,   ijjijijijijijijijYP   CHholdHWHWX 22)|1( is 
rearranged as    ijjijijijijijijijYP   CHholdHWHWX 22)|1( , , where W, H, and Hhold 
represent the wife's, husband's and household's characteristics respectively and C the 
remaining controls.  
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time dummies are all significantly negative starting from 1993 but their relatively stable 
magnitude suggests that the overall effect of this differential is not revealing a clear trend.   
     To conclude, decision-making within the family appears to be affected by each of the 
factors that may determine a position of dominance for any of the spouse. Strictly economic 
factors are important, but education and age also matter. Furthermore, while the effects of the 
age and income differentials do not show any clear time variability, the importance of the 
education differential appears to have increased over time. In other words,  the intra-
household balance of power appears to be not just a question of money, but also of brains, 
and this is increasingly so. 
Table 4. Within-couple differentials and their interactions with time 








Differential  0.0038*** 0.0361*** 0.0122*** 
  (4.185) (5.963) (9.299) 
 1991*Differential 0.0014 -0.0232*** 0.0028 
 (0.814) (2.819) (1.102) 
 1993*Differential -0.0003 -0.0117* -0.0060*** 
  (0.275) (1.882) (4.585) 
 1995*Differential -0.0007 -0.0142*** -0.0053*** 
 (0.554) (2.636) (4.330) 
 1998*Differential -0.0019 -0.0124** -0.0060*** 
 (1.304) (2.381) (4.127) 
 2000*Differential -0.0002 -0.0120** -0.0077*** 
 (0.224) (2.242) (5.549) 
 2002*Differential -0.0001 -0.0096** -0.0065*** 
 (0.047) (2.096) (4.464) 
 2004*Differential -0.0003 -0.0089** -0.0064*** 
 (0.217) (2.173) (4.093) 
 2006*Differential -0.0006 -0.0125** -0.0059*** 
 (0.517) (2.354) (5.126) 
 2008*Differential 0.0003 -0.0095 -0.0065*** 
 (0.277) (1.571) (4.268) 
 2010*Differential 0.0004 -0.0101* -0.0055*** 
 (0.368) (1.656) (4.029) 
Household characteristics YES 
Wife’s characteristics YES 
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Husband’s characteristics YES 
Background variables YES 
Observations 59,389 
Pseudo R2 0.3697 
Notes: Marginal effects of probit estimates with robust standard errors 
clustered at the regional level. Each regression includes time and regional 
dummies.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
5. Robustness checks 
 
     In this section we consider a number of variations and extensions of the previous analysis 
in order to check its robustness. We will consider as a reference Column 5 of Table 3, i.e., the 
specification that emphasizes within-household differences and at the same time allows for a 
non-linear impact of individual characteristics. 
 
5.1. Type of choices 
 
     Financial and economic decisions of the households range from simple chores such as 
paying bills to more complex choices such as the asset allocation of the household’s 
portfolio. In this section we test whether the probability of the wife being in charge is higher 
when financial and economic decisions reduce to very simple tasks. To this end, we use the 
information provided by the SHIW since the 2000 wave and define the dummy “simple 
choices”, taking value 1 if the household declares to use  banking services only for paying 
bills (including housing rent and mortgages) and/or for wage crediting and 0 otherwise. This 
implies that tasks such as securities management or trading, asset administration or 
insurances management are excluded. As shown in Table 1, 78.65% of the households in our 
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sample are confined to simple choices. The results of the regression, reported in Table 5, do 
not change substantially in the presence of the dummy, whose effect is positive but not 
significant. Therefore we cannot conclude that wives are more likely to be in charge if only 
simple tasks are at issue.    
Table 5. Simple financial tasks 
Dependent variable: Female Head 
Variables (1) 
Proxies for bargaining power 
Age differential  0.0107*** 
 (2.927) 
Education differential  0.0800*** 
 (3.346) 
Income differential  0.0213*** 
  (8.58) 
Household characteristics 
Family size 0.0654*** 
  (3.158) 
Family size2 -0.0064*** 
  (2.628) 
Income – 2nd quartile -0.0047 
  (0.349) 
Income – 3rd quartile -0.0464*** 
  (3.134) 
Income – 4th quartile -0.0860*** 
  (3.988) 
Wealth – 2nd quartile -0.0012 
  (0.109) 
Wealth – 3rd quartile -0.008 
  (0.857) 
Wealth – 4th quartile -0.0267* 
  (1.93) 
Simple choices 0.0057 
  (0.79) 
Wife’s characteristics  
Age  0.0061** 
  (2.193) 
Age2 -0.0208*** 
  (10.79) 
Education -0.0265 
  (0.99) 
Education2 -0.9638*** 
 (2.895) 
Income  0.0292*** 




  (12.779) 
Working wife  -0.2367*** 
  (19.221) 
Husband’s characteristics  
Age2 0.0112*** 
  (3.535) 
Education2 1.0761*** 
  (2.644) 
Income2 0.0062*** 
  (6.871) 
Working husband  0.1182*** 
  (9.284) 
Background variables 
Divorce hazard  0.2079* 
  (1.834) 
Female employment rate 0.528 
  (0.728) 
Observations 19,400 
Pseudo R-squared (0.3271) 
 Notes: Marginal effects of probit estimates with robust 
standard errors clustered at the regional level. Each 
regression includes time and regional dummies.* significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
5.2. Occupational status 
 
     In this sub-section we evaluate the implications of a more detailed description of the 
individual positions in the labor market. So far we have considered two dummy variables 
capturing the fact that the wife and the husband are employed and we have found a negative 
influence for the first and a positive one for the second. However, this specification does not 
highlight within-family differences in occupational status. Therefore in Table 6, Column 1 we 
introduce three separate dummies. The first one captures the case when the wife is the only 
one who is employed. The second captures the case when the husband is the only one who is 
employed. The third captures the case when both spouses do not work, uncovering the 
potential presence of an interaction between their respective status. The effect of the first two 
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dummies confirms what previously found, while the positive effect of the third adds that 
when both spouses do not work the probability that the wife is in charge increases. In Column 
2 we evaluate more explicitly the working condition of each spouse, including dummies for 
being employee, self-employed, or retired. We also control for the status of housewife. The 
results suggest that for both spouses being an employee rather than self-employed does not 
modify the effect of being at work on the dependent variable, while being a housewife has no 
significant effect. Being retired has a negative effect for the wife and a non-significant one 
for the husband, possibly because of the older age of the couples in this status. Starting from 
the 2000 wave the SHIW also provides information about job tenure and part-time 
occupation. For this restricted sample, in Column 3 we find that being tenured confirms for 
both wives and husbands the general impact of the original dummy for being at work, while 
having a part-time position shows opposite signs, suggesting that both wives and husbands in 
this intermediate status tend to behave more like non working rather than working ones. The 
main conclusion regarding the impact of within-couple differentials is not affected, as their 
marginal effects remain remarkably stable in terms of size and significance across all 
specifications. However, it should be noticed that when the sample is restricted to the 2000-
2010 period their size nearly doubles, suggesting that their influence might be increasing over 
time.   
Table 6. Finer measures of occupational status. 
Dependent variable: Female  head 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Proxies for bargaining power 
Age differential  0.0052*** 0.0051*** 0.0103*** 
 (4.44) (4.728) (3.81) 
Education differential  0.0361*** 0.0382*** 0.0723*** 
 (5.66) (6.260) (3.84) 
Income differential  0.0086*** 0.0089*** 0.0169*** 
  (9.13) (8.998) (7.25) 
Household characteristics 
Family size 0.0210*** 0.0146*** 0.0605*** 
  (3.32) (2.728) (3.81) 
 
 32
Family size2 -0.0019** -0.0013** -0.0055*** 
  (2.57) (2.020) (3.05) 
Income – 2nd quartile 0.0046 0.0113*** -0.0115 
  (1.11) (3.294) (1.31) 
Income – 3rd quartile -0.0122** -0.0057 -0.0461*** 
  (2.56) (1.447) (3.90) 
Income – 4th quartile -0.0279*** -0.0272*** -0.0799*** 
  (4.07) (4.337) (4.39) 
Wealth – 2nd quartile -0.0052* -0.0062** -0.0049 
  (1.73) (2.291) (0.55) 
Wealth – 3rd quartile -0.0101*** -0.0109*** -0.0124* 
  (3.92) (4.290) (1.88) 
Wealth – 4th quartile -0.0171*** -0.0187*** -0.0340*** 
  (5.73) (6.364) (3.91) 
Only wife works  -0.0162***   
  (4.08)     
Only husband works  0.2109***   
  (19.05)     
None works 0.1032***   
  (13.14)     
Wife’s characteristics  
Age  0.0003 -0.0011** 0.0023 
  (0.59) (2.284) (1.40) 
Age2 -0.0075*** -0.0048*** -0.0155*** 
  (8.51) (5.245) (7.78) 
Education -0.0102* -0.0121* -0.007 
  (1.65) (1.748) (0.41) 
Education2 -0.4839*** -0.4828*** -1.1261*** 
 (4.13) (3.854) (3.86) 
Income  0.0143*** 0.0178*** 0.0257*** 
  (13.02) (10.452) (9.26) 
Income2 -0.0193*** -0.0239*** -0.0334*** 
  (5.49) (4.752) (5.40) 
Employee wife   -0.1088***  
    (12.570)   
Self-employed wife -0.0555***  
    (10.265)   
Housewife  -0.0016  
    (0.234)   
Retired wife -0.0657***  
    (8.408)   
Tenured wife    -0.1688*** 
      (17.67) 
Part-time wife    0.0818*** 
      (6.47) 
Husband’s characteristics  
Age2 0.0054*** 0.0051*** 0.0098*** 
 
 33
  (4.85) (5.096) (3.91) 
Education2 0.5203*** 0.5373*** 0.9702*** 
  (4.70) (5.080) (2.90) 
Income2 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0030*** 
  (9.13) (9.332) (7.24) 
Employee husband 0.0435***  
    (6.495)   
Self-employed husband 0.0525***  
    (5.031)   
Retired husband   0.0116  
    (1.639)   
Tenured husband   0.0674*** 
      (8.22) 
Part-time husband   -0.0730*** 
      (6.30) 
Background variables 
Divorce hazard  -0.086 -0.0662 0.0489 
  (1.16) (0.942) (0.35) 
Female employment rate 0.058 0.042 0.4324 
  (0.30) (0.232) (0.78) 
Observations 59,389 59,389 30,345 
Pseudo R-squared 0.3662 0.3953 0.2800 
Notes: Marginal effects of probit estimates with robust standard errors clustered at the 
regional level. Each regression includes time and regional dummies.* significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
 
5.3. Marriage vs. cohabitation 
 
     So far our sample included only legally married couples. Over time, however, cohabitation 
has become a more and more widespread phenomenon. Exploiting the fact that the SHIW 
also surveys cohabiting couples that are not married, we repeat our estimation for a sample of 
non-married couples. While the number of observations is greatly reduced, the evidence 
presented in the data section suggests that this living arrangement will be expanding in the 
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future, so it is important to understand if it matters for the economic power balance.12 The 
fact that the sample presents a much larger proportion of female heads, 41.8%, suggests that 
it does.  
     From the first column of Table 7 we can see that results are strikingly different from those 
obtained for married couples. The differentials within the couple are very significant, but the 
education differential now shows a negative sign, suggesting that for this sample women that 
have more education than their partners are less likely to make decisions. The effect of the 
wives’ education and income also tends to differ from the case of married couples. Moreover, 
family income is no longer significant. While the latter finding could indicate that non-
married couples do not pool their earnings, at the same time their joint wealth is still playing 
a clear role. Another novel feature is that the divorce hazard in the region of residence exerts 
a marginally significant negative effect. However, since cohabitation is a relatively new 
tendency, cohort effects may be at work, as shown by the lower average ages in the sample 
(43.24 and 39.99 for husbands and wives respectively). To sum up, despite the small size of 
the sample involved, it is clear that the institution of marriage exerts a decisive influence on 
intra-family decision processes. One issue that deserves further exploration is whether or not 
the decision itself to tie the knot, and the clear time evolution of its frequency, may itself 




                                                 
12 The number of cohabiting couples surveyed has increased from zero in 1989 to 146 
(around 3% of the couples) in 2010. Yet, the cohabiting households surveyed over the total 
period are only 811, so that under-sampling and under-reporting may be serious issues 
regarding these data.  
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Table 7. Alternative samples: Unmarried couples and older couples 
Dependent variable: Female  head 
Variables Cohabiting Age 51-61 Age 50+ 
Proxies for bargaining power  
Age differential  0.0462*** 0.0026 0.0088*** 
 (3.584) (0.690) (4.164) 
Education differential  -0.3471*** 0.0255** 0.0274*** 
 (3.356) (2.432) (4.238) 
Income differential  0.0499*** 0.0077*** 0.0088*** 
  (6.674) (8.307) (10.057) 
Household characteristics 
Family size 0.2959* 0.0178** 0.0238*** 
  (1.795) (2.125) (3.089) 
Family size2 -0.0269 -0.0017* -0.0024*** 
  (1.120) (1.871) (2.834) 
Income – 2nd quartile 0.0962 -0.0018 0.0007 
 (1.429) (0.327) (0.125) 
Income – 3rd quartile 0.1053 -0.0134* -0.0120* 
 (1.536) (1.753) (1.830) 
Income – 4th quartile 0.1073 -0.0237** -0.0190** 
 (0.841) (2.396) (2.199) 
Wealth – 2nd quartile -0.1058** -0.0022 -0.0055 
 (2.096) (0.494) (1.569) 
Wealth – 3rd quartile -0.1454** -0.0076** -0.0089*** 
 (2.229) (2.109) (3.084) 
Wealth – 4th quartile -0.2220*** -0.0150*** -0.0137*** 
 (3.515) (2.795) (3.453) 
Wife’s characteristics  
Age  0.011 0.0148*** -0.0080*** 
  (1.169) (2.717) (5.690) 
Age2 -0.0625*** -0.0194*** -0.0032** 
  (3.340) (4.195) (2.028) 
Education 0.0846 0.0072 0.0078 
  (0.963) (0.748) (1.124) 
Education2 4.4547*** -0.6514*** -0.7255*** 
  (3.003) (4.461) (8.160) 
Income  0.0609*** 0.0124*** 0.0105*** 
  (4.119) (9.519) (11.165) 
Income2 -0.1892*** -0.0190*** -0.0160*** 
  (7.083) (7.318) (15.517) 
Working wife -0.5081*** -0.0861*** -0.0625*** 
  (9.031) (23.413) (27.415) 
Husband’s characteristics  
Age2 0.0424*** 0.0025 0.0076*** 
  (3.100) (0.769) (4.699) 
Education2 -6.4699*** 0.3627** 0.4594*** 
  (3.990) (2.112) (3.820) 
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Income2 0.0488*** 0.0024*** 0.0027*** 
  (6.249) (7.265) (7.466) 
Working husband 0.2088*** 0.0300*** 0.0386*** 
  (2.867) (5.403) (5.855) 
Background variables 
Divorce hazard  -1.0669* -0.0525 -0.05 
  (1.737) (0.854) (0.879) 
Female employment rate -1.3075 0.0238 0.0707 
  (0.741) (0.145) (0.544) 
Observations 808 20,906 33,917 
Pseudo R2 0.3687 0.3901 0.3899 
Notes: Marginal effects of probit estimates with robust standard errors 
clustered at the regional level. Each regression includes time and regional 
dummies.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
5.4. Two older samples 
 
     Most of the existing studies on the determinants of bargaining power are conducted within 
restricted samples including only older couples. This is the case for studies based both on the 
US HRS and the Mexican MHS. For instance, the 1992 wave of the HRS only includes 
individuals in the 51-61 age range, while in most recent waves  all over-50 individuals are in. 
It is therefore not surprising that age differentials are hardly ever a significant factor within 
these studies. For the sake of comparison, we replicate our analysis first for a 51-61 age-
range sub-sample, and then for a sub-sample of over-50 (however, it has to be kept in mind 
that our Italian sample includes eleven waves covering 22 years, rather than a single wave as 
in the other cases). The second column of Table 7 shows that, for the 51-61 year-old, the age 
differential remains positive but loses its significance, while it retains it for the over-50 year-
old. To be noticed is that the latter sample is quite large relative to the former (33,917 
observations vs. 20,906) and naturally involves more variability along the age dimension. 
The impact of education and income differentials resembles that of the complete sample and 
the same holds for family size, income and wealth. Overall, our results are consistent with 
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those obtained by others over older samples. At the same time, however, they reveal how 
crucial the inclusion of individuals of all ages into the investigation is in order to capture the 
impact of all dimensions of couples’ heterogamy. 
 
5.5. Dummy measures for within-household heterogeneity 
 
     In Table 8 we start by replicating the set of regressions presented in Table 3 using 
alternative measures for within-household heterogeneity, defined as three dummies capturing 
the fact that the wife is older, more educated, and earning more income than her husband. 
While these dichotomous measures are of course coarser than the ones used so far, they are 
often employed in the literature (by Elder and Rudolf, 2003, for a similar dependent variable 
reflecting within-couple decision power, and for instance by Lundberg, Startz and Stillman, 
2003, Lundberg and Ward-Batts, 2000, Thomas, 1994, Heaton, 2002, Teachman, 2002, and 
Bertocchi, Brunetti and Torricelli, 2011, for a variety of alternative ones).  
     Columns 1-3 show that the fact that the wife is in a position of dominance, along each 
dimension taken one by one, increases her bargaining power. In Column 4 the dummies are 
entered together with the wife's characteristics (as in most of the previously cited references) 
at the expense of some significance for the first but, when in Column 5 we retain our full 
specification we find that the dummy for the wife being older is never significant. This 
exercise questions the ability of the dummies for age and education to proxy for degrees of 
bargaining power when the regression is correctly specified. Moreover, it implies that adding 
dummies and female individual variables in regressions not including variables such as 
household income and wealth may induce misspecification.   
     By comparing these results with those obtained in the previous section, we can conclude 
that measuring the degree of heterogamy within couples with precise differential measures, 
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rather than with dummies for the wife being in a position of predominance, leads to more 
clear-cut and powerful conclusions.  
 
Table 8. Dummy measures of within-couple differences 
Dependent variable: Female  head 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dichotomous proxies for bargaining power 
Wife older 0.0133***   0.0086** 0.0023 
  (2.898)   (2.075) (0.597) 
Wife more educated  0.0487***  0.0304*** 0.0153*** 
   (10.410)  (4.433) (2.631) 
Wife earns more   0.4945*** 0.3687*** 0.2659*** 
    (23.044) (19.722) (13.445) 
Wife’s characteristics 
Age     -0.0016** 0.0012** 
        (2.195) (2.239) 
Age2    -0.0020*** -0.0036*** 
        (2.903) (6.362) 
Education    -0.0044 0.0074 
        (0.547) (1.067) 
Education2    -0.3936*** -0.3588*** 
        (2.663) (2.983) 
Income     0.0167*** 0.0218*** 
        (13.022) (12.190) 
Income2    -0.0171*** -0.0215*** 
        (6.568) (6.413) 
Working wife    -0.1124*** -0.1080*** 
        (22.645) (20.701) 
Household characteristics 
Family size     0.0323*** 
          (3.956) 
Family size2     -0.0027*** 
          (2.913) 
Income – 2nd quartile     -0.0148*** 
         (4.161) 
Income – 3rd quartile     -0.0398*** 
         (8.769) 
Income – 4th quartile     -0.0740*** 
         (11.758) 
Wealth – 2nd quartile     -0.0127*** 
     (3.960) 
Wealth – 3rd quartile     -0.0214*** 
     (9.198) 
Wealth – 4th quartile     -0.0422*** 
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         (14.286) 
Background variables 
Divorce hazard      -0.1374 
          (1.463) 
Female employment rate     0.0628 
          (0.260) 
Observations 59,389 59,389 59,389 59,389 59,389 
Pseudo R-squared 0.1179 0.1219 0.2684 0.3285 0.3524 
Notes: Marginal effects of probit estimates with robust standard errors clustered at the 
regional level. Each regression includes time and regional dummies.* significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
 
6. Conclusion  
 
Based on a dataset drawn from the Bank of Italy SHIW we empirically study the 
determinants of the economic and financial power balance within households on the basis of 
a unique, repeatedly-collected direct measure of actual decision-making power. Our main 
findings are that the probability that the wife is in charge of economic and financial decisions 
increases with the difference between her years of age, her level of education, her individual 
income, and the corresponding husband’s characteristics. At the same time, her bargaining 
power is also affected by household characteristics such as family size and total income and 
wealth. The main implication of these findings is that the decision-making power over family 
economics is not only determined by strictly economic factors: differences in age and 
education, by making individuals more knowledgeable, more experienced, and savvier, are 
also shown to matter. Furthermore, exploiting the time dimension of our dataset, we show 
that this pattern has progressively strengthened over the 20-year sample period under 
consideration. In other words, the intra-household balance of power appears to be not just a 
question of money, but also of brains, and this is increasingly so.  
 
 40
These results represent an important step forward with respect to the available literature, 
especially in light of the fact that social trends may prove faster than purely economic ones. 
To recognize all the determinants of bargaining power is crucial to understand how the latter 
affects a wide variety of economic and non-economic decisions, and how gender-based 
policies should be designed. 
     Following a generalized trend within Europe, the Italian society is quickly changing its 
ethnic and religious composition because of immigration. This is introducing yet another 
source of heterogamy within marriages that may constitute another potential driver of power 
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Table A.1. Description of variables 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION   
SHIW DATA 
Source: http://www.bancaditalia.it/statistiche/indcamp/bilfait  
Female head 
Binary variable assuming value 1 if the wife is in charge of the 
economic and financial decisions of the household, 0 otherwise.  
Age differential  
Variable representing the difference between wife and husband age, 
ranging between -57 and 48. 
Education differential  
Variable representing the difference between wife and husband 
highest education level, ranging between -4 and 3. 
Income differential  
Variable representing the difference between wife and husband 
individual income, ranging between -600 and 101.  
Wife older 
Binary variable assuming value 1 if within the couple the wife is older 
than the husband, 0 otherwise. 
Wife more educated  
Binary variable assuming value 1 if within the couple the wife is more 
educated than the husband, 0 otherwise. 
Wife earns more  
Binary variable assuming value 1 if within the couple the wife earns a 
higher income than the husband, 0 otherwise. 
Family size Number of household components ranging between 2 and 12. 
Income 
Continuous variable representing household income at 1989 constant 
values expressed in thousand €. 
Wealth 
Continuous variable representing household net wealth at 1989 
constant values expressed in thousand €.  
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Only wife works 
Binary variable assuming value 1 if within the couple the wife works 
and the husband does not, 0 otherwise.  
Only husband works 
Binary variable assuming value 1 if within the couple the husband 
works and the wife does not, 0 otherwise. 
None works 
Binary variable assuming value 1 if within the couple neither the wife 
nor the husband work, 0 otherwise. 
Simple choices 
Binary variable assuming value 1 if the household declares to use the 
banking services only to pay bills, housing rent and mortgage 
installments or to have wages credited, 0 otherwise. 
Wife’s age,  
Husband’s age 
Integer variables representing the age of the wife (ranging between 16 
and 96) and of the husband (ranging between 19 and 98).  
Wife’s education,  
Husband’s education 
Categorical variables representing the highest education level among 
the following achieved respectively by the wife and the husband: 
1 = no education 
2 = primary school 
3 = secondary school 
4 = college 
5= graduate level 
6 = post-graduate level. 
Wife’s income,  
Husband’s income 
Continuous variables representing the individual incomes of the wife 
and of the husband respectively, both expressed at 1989 constant 
values in thousand €. 
Working wife,  
Working husband 
Binary variables assuming value 1 if wife and husband respectively 
are working, 0 otherwise.  
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Employee wife,  
Employee husband  
Binary variables assuming value 1 if wife and husband respectively 
are working as an employee, 0 otherwise. 
Self-employed wife,  
Self-employed husband  
Binary variables assuming value 1 if wife and husband respectively 
are working as a self-employed, 0 otherwise. 
Tenured wife,  
Tenured husband 
Binary variable assuming value 1 if wife and husband respectively 
hold a tenured working position, 0 otherwise (i.e., if they hold a 
temporary job). 
Part-time job wife,  
Part-time job husband 
Binary variable assuming value 1 if wife and husband respectively 
hold a part-time job, 0 otherwise.  
Housewife  
Binary variable assuming value 1 if the wife is housewife, 0 
otherwise. 
Retired wife,  
Retired husband 
Binary variable assuming value 1 if wife and husband respectively are 
retired, 0 otherwise.  
Istat DATA 
Source: http://www.istat.it/  
Divorce hazard 
Number of divorces over number of marriages at the regional level. 
Ranging between 2% and 45%. 
Female employment rate 
Female employment rate at the regional level, computed as the ratio 
of women employed over total female working-age (15-64) 
population in the region. Ranging between 13% and 45%. 
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